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Abstract
Recent advancements in CNNs have shown remarkable
achievements in various CV/AI applications. Though CNNs
show near human or better than human performance in
many critical tasks, they are quite vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. These attacks are potentially dangerous in real-life
deployments. Though there have been many adversarial at-
tacks proposed in recent years, there is no proper way of
quantifying the effectiveness of these attacks. As of today,
mere fooling rate is used for measuring the susceptibility of
the models, or the effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Fool-
ing rate just considers label flipping and does not consider
the cost of such flipping, for instance, in some deployments,
flipping between two species of dogs may not be as severe as
confusing a dog category with that of a vehicle. Therefore,
the metric to quantify the vulnerability of the models should
capture the severity of the flipping as well. In this work
we first bring out the drawbacks of the existing evaluation
and propose novel metrics to capture various aspects of the
fooling. Further, for the first time, we present a comprehen-
sive analysis of several important adversarial attacks over
a set of distinct CNN architectures. We believe that the pre-
sented analysis brings valuable insights about the current
adversarial attacks and the CNN models.
1. Introduction
Machine learning (ML) models are observed (e.g. [1, 2])
to be unstable to addition of structured noises known as ad-
versarial perturbations. These perturbations, despite being
mild, tend to severely alter the inference of the ML mod-
els, generally referred to as fooling the models. Over the
time, number of different adversarial attacks (algorithms to
fool) were proposed (e.g. [23, 13, 3, 15, 16]) to demonstrate
the vulnerability of the current ML systems, particularly
the deep neural networks (DNNs). In case of a recognition
model, it is understood that an adversarial attack is success-
* contributed equally
ful when the model predicts a different label upon adding
the perturbation. Thus, all the existing works treat this label
flipping as fooling the model. Therefore, they quantify the
effectiveness of the underlying attack in terms of its fooling
or success rate, which is the percentage of successful flips.
However, fooling rate is a weak metric which fails to
capture various important aspects of fooling and ends up
giving only partial picture about the attack or the target
model. Specifically, it does not consider what the ‘post-
attack’ label is, and therefore fails to quantify the severity of
the attack on either semantic or visual scale. Consequently,
the fooling rate becomes apathetic to different flippings of
the label and treats them identical. Though, from the ro-
bustness perspective, all label flippings should be treated
equally, and a robust ML system should avoid any such
susceptibility, in practice, different flippings (misclassifica-
tions) may inflict in different costs. For instance, in certain
deployments, confusion between a pair of dog breeds is ac-
ceptable and not as severe as wrongly recognizing the stop
sign on a highway.
Particularly, datasets with unwanted bias towards a set
of semantically similar categories (e.g. ImageNet [20] has
12% dog categories) need sophisticated metrics for better
analysis of the attacks and models. In such cases, weak
metrics such as fooling rate could be misleading by provid-
ing only an incomplete picture of the models’ vulnerability.
Existing evaluation (e.g. [19, 10, 12]) to compare various
adversarial attacks is based solely on their fooling rate per-
formance. However, the spectrum of existing attacks should
be understood and analysed from not only the fooling rate
perspective but also various other aspects of fooling, for in-
stance, the actual semantic damage incurred due to the ad-
versarial attack, etc. Moreover, fooling rate alone fails to
bring out useful insights about the learning and the classi-
fication hyper-planes learned by these models. Therefore,
the metric to quantify the effectiveness of the adversarial
attacks should apprehend the severity of the flipping and
provide better information about both the model and the un-
derlying attack.
Hence, in this work, we present various important as-
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Figure 1. Fooling rate does not measure the extent of confusion caused by an adversarial attack. First column is the input image presented
to GoogLeNet [22] below which the pre-attack label is mentioned in green. The subsequent columns show the representative images
for the predicted post-attack labels for 7 different adversarial attacks. Note that the attacks are mentioned on top of the corresponding
representative images taken from the ILSVRC dataset.
pects of fooling caused by adversarial attacks. Specifically,
we consider the Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
trained for visual object recognition. The major contribu-
tions of this work can be listed as:
• We present the shortcomings of the existing evaluation
in order to emphasize the need for more sophisticated
tools for analysis
• We propose a set of useful metrics (as baselines) to
understand the attacks and models more comprehen-
sively
• We present a detailed analysis and comparison of sev-
eral important adversarial attacks over a set of distinct
CNN architectures
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the
shortcomings in the existing evaluation and proposes multi-
ple novel metrics to bring out the various important aspects
of the adversarial fooling, section 3 presents comprehensive
empirical analysis on several important image agnostic and
image specific adversarial attacks, section 4 narrates some
of the important observations, and finally section 6.4 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Fooling beyond Flipping
In this section we demonstrate how fooling rate fails to
capture various important aspects of confusing a DNN and
present a set of useful metrics to better understand it.
2.1. Shortcomings of Fooling Rate (FR)
Fooling rate, by definition is the percentage of success
for an adversarial attack, i.e., expected number of times the
attack is able to flip the label because of the added perturba-
tion. For the rest of the paper, we define the label predicted
on a clean image as pre-attack label and that predicted on
the corresponding adversarial image as post-attack label.
Thus, the fooling rate (FR) is defined as∑N
i=1 1(pre-attack label(i) 6= post-attack label(i))
N
(1)
where 1 is the indicator function that returns 1 if the argu-
ment is true, else returns 0, and N is the total number of
samples on which the attack is evaluated.
Clearly the fooling rate ignores what the post-attack la-
bel is. All that it matters is, if it is different from the pre-
attack label or not. Thus, it does not measure the extent
of the confusion caused by the adversarial attack. Since,
some of the categories in the underlying dataset can be vi-
sually very close compared to others, not all mistakes are
similar. For example, Figure 1 shows the post-attack labels
predicted by GoogLeNet [22] for 7 different adversarial at-
tacks. The input image is shown in the first column, who’s
pre-attack label is mixing-bowl. Note that the subsequent
columns show (hand-picked) representative images for the
predicted post-attack labels mentioned below them in red.
Also, the corresponding adversarial attacks are mentioned
above the representative images.
It is important to note that, though all the post-attack la-
bels are different from the pre-attack label, visual patterns
in some of the representative images are closer to the input
image than others. For instance, eggnog and thimble will
have bowl-like object patterns. On the other hand, wool and
viaduct are visually very dissimilar to the pre-attack label,
mixing-bowl. However, fooling rate treats them all as suc-
cessful fooling without considering the perceptual distance.
In the following subsections, we present multiple metrics
that reveal more information about the adversarial fooling.
2.2. FR@K
We know that the fooling rate does not consider the rank
of the pre-attack label after the attack. However, it would
be interesting to know how strong an attack can demote the
pre-attack label from rank-1, for instance, to compare dif-
ferent attacks or to understand the nature of the attack, etc.
Therefore, we extend the definition of existing fooling rate
in order to consider the rank of the pre-attack label using
“Fooling rate at rank K” (FR@K). This means, for a given
rank K, an attack is considered successful only if it assigns
a rank > K to the pre-attack label. Therefore, after the at-
tack, there will be at leastK-1 other labels with greater con-
fidence than the pre-attack label. Intuitively, the FR@K
metric quantifies the extent of damage caused to the visual
features discriminative to the pre-attack label due to the at-
tack. Thus, FR@K is defined as
∑N
i=1 1(pre-attack label(i) 6∈ {top-K post-attack labels(i)})
N
(2)
Note that when K=1, FR@K becomes the fooling rate. A
similar metric in spirit has been proposed by Ganeshan et
al. [5] where they quantify the shifts in the ranks of pre and
post-attack labels during the attack.
2.3. Mean semantic confusion: QI-Wup
Existing evaluation completely ignores to measure the
“semantic damage” caused by the adversarial attacks. This
is because the fooling rate is apathetic to different flippings
by adversarial attacks. However, there exist various at-
tacks that are designed with very different objective func-
tions though the ultimate goal is to fool the target model.
Thus, it is quite possible that a given model incurs varying
levels of confusion for different adversarial attacks. For in-
stance, in Figure 1, GoogLeNet confuses Mixing-bowl to a
range of different labels from wine bottle to viaduct. Note
that the post-attack labels resulted by different attacks lie
at different semantic distance to the pre-attack label. Also,
different deployment environments (e.g. household, com-
mercial, military, etc.) would work with varied levels of
acceptable confusion. It is beneficial to have a useful metric
that can quantify the actual semantic damage incurred by a
given model for various attacks.
In this subsection we introduce an intuitive metric named
“Mean semantic confusion”, that can quantify the semantic
damage caused by an adversarial attack (or in other words,
the semantic damage incurred by a given model). We adapt
the familiar word similarity metrics such as Wu-Palmer [24]
to measure the severity of the flipping on a semantic scale.
We define the Quantized Inverse Wup similarity (QI-Wup)
as
QI-Wup =
{
1, ifWup(pre-attacklabel, post-attacklabel) < Ts.
0, otherwise.
(3)
where Wup(x, y) is the Wup similarity between the words
x and y and Ts is a threshold chosen based on the target
deployment environment. Note that the proposed QI-Wup
metric deems a flipping as fooling only when the semantic
similarity is less than an acceptable threshold Ts. Different
thresholds can be chosen for various deployment scenar-
ios (see supplementary materials) based on the acceptable
semantic confusion.
Therefore, the mean semantic confusion can be com-
puted as the average QI-Wup score over a set of evalua-
tion samples. Note that Wup measure is one choice of word
(semantic) similarity and we can chose any other similarity.
2.4. Mean visual confusion: QI-Vis
Another very important aspect of adversarial fooling is
to understand if the CNN models get confused only among
“visually” closer labels or even the dissimilar ones (refer to
section 4.1). For instance, as shown in Figure 1, GoogLeNet
gets confused to recognize the Mixing-bowl to various la-
bels. The Deepfool [13] attack flips the label to eggnog.
Note that the eggnog images always have a bowl like con-
tainer to hold it. Therefore, in this case the attack tries to
fool the model to predict another class that has similar vi-
sual patterns. While in case of other attacks, particularly the
image-agnostic attacks such as UAP [12], GD-UAP [14] it
is less observed.
In case of measuring the semantic damage, we have a
hierarchical structure (graph) such as WordNet [11] to un-
derstand how the labels are semantically related. However,
such a data structure for ‘visual’ relations does not exist.
It is very difficult to collect the visual similarities among
the categories via human annotations given large number of
classes and intra class variations. Thus, (similar to [18])
we collect these visual similarities from the learned model
itself. The final layer of any classification layer will be
a fully connected (fc) layer with a softmax nonlinearity.
Each neuron in this layer corresponds to a class (c) and its
activation is treated as the confidence/probability (Sc) pre-
dicted by the model to that class. The weights connecting
previous layer to this neuron (Wc) can be considered as the
template of the class (c) learned by the network. This is be-
cause, the confidence predicted (Sc) is proportional to the
alignment of the previous layer’s output with the template
(Wc). It becomes maximum when the previous layer’s out-
put is a positive scaled version of this template (Wc). On the
other hand, if the output of the previous layer is misaligned
with the template Wc, the confidence Sc is reduced.
Therefore, we compute the visual similarity (as per-
ceived by the target model) between a pair of classes i and
j as
V is(i, j) =
Wi
TWj
‖Wi‖ ‖Wj‖ (4)
Using this similarity score, we define the Quantized In-
verse Visual Similarity (QI-V is) as
QI-V is =
{
1, if V is(pre-attack label, post-attack label) < Tv.
0, otherwise.
(5)
Where Tv is a threshold chosen in order to impose a desired
tolerance in terms of visual confusion. Note that V is(i, j)
may not lie in [0, 1] unlike the Wup measure. Also, V is is
one of the possible visual similarity measures, and QI-V is
can be computed over any such measure. Further, for a
given dataset, our visual similarities are model specific,
however it is still a valid candidate for visual similarity since
we observe that multiple models closely agree upon these
similarities. For the 4 models considered in our experi-
ments, the variance of class similarities computed across the
1000 ILSVRC categories is very small with a mean value of
6× 10−4(±5.95× 10−4). See supplementary materials for
more details.
3. Experiments
In this section we present the experimental analysis to
show the effectiveness of the aforementioned metrics. We
performed all our experiments on the models trained for
object recognition on ILSVRC [20] dataset. To be com-
prehensive, we considered models from different architec-
ture families, namely, CaffeNet [8], GoogLeNet [22], VGG-
19 [21], ResNet-152 [7]. Note that the evaluation is per-
formed on 10000 correctly classified images from the vali-
dation set. We considered a range of adversarial attacks that
include image specific, image agnostic and iterative vari-
ants. Specifically, we evaluated on the following
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6]
• Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [10]
• DeepFool [13]
• Carlini and Wagner (CW) [3]
• Univeral Adversarial Perturbations (UAP) [12]
• Generalizable Data-free UAP (GD-UAP) [14]
We briefly introduce these attacks along with the required
notation for the ease of reference.
• X : clean image from the dataset.
• Xadv : potential adversarial image crafted from X .
• ytrue : ground truth label corresponding to X .
• ypred : prediction of the neural network for X .
• f : mapping function that represents neural network
•  : strength of perturbation added to the clean image.
• J : loss function used to train the neural network.
• ∇J : gradient of the loss J with respect to image X .
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): is a simple way to
craft adversaries. They linearly approximate the loss func-
tion and compute the gradient as the adversarial direction to
perturb the input:
Xadv = X + .sign(∇J(X, ytrue)) (6)
I-FGSM-LL is a variety of the FGSM attack, in which
we iteratively (with small steps) compute the perturbation
in order to decrease the loss for predicting a ‘least-likely’
label.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): One can think
of FGSM attack as a single-step scheme to maximize
the loss function within the  ball around X , which is
represented by S. A powerful attack would be an iterative
variation, FGSMk, which is essentially performing
Projected Gradient Descent on the negative loss function:
Xt+1 = ΠX+S(Xt + α.sign(∇J(X, ytrue))) (7)
where t is the iteration, and α is the maximum perturbation
at each iteration.
DeepFool: defines an adversarial perturbation as the
minimal perturbation v that is sufficient to change the
inference of the classifier:
minv subject to f(X + v) 6= f(X) (8)
Their algorithm is a greedy method that approximates the
non-linear class boundaries as hyper-planes and in practice
(generally) yields a small and effective perturbation.
Carlini and Wagner attack (CW): makes the pertur-
bations quasi-imperceptible by minimizing the lp norm.
This is achieved by solving the following optimization
problem:
minimize ||v||p + c.g(X + v) (9)
such that X + v ∈ [0, 1] (10)
Here g is a surrogate objective function such that
g(x+ v) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ f(x+ v) = t. Here v is the adversarial
perturbation, c is a constant, t is the target label and f is a
mapping function that represents the neural network.
Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP): presented an
algorithm to compute a perturbation agnostic to the input
samples, known as ‘Universal’ Adversarial Perturbation
(v).
||v||p ≤  (11)
PX∼µ(f(X + v) 6=f(X)) ≥ 1− Th (12)
where, Th quantifies the desired fooling rate. Their algo-
rithm simply accumulates the individual sample specific
DeepFool [13] adversarial perturbations and regularly
projects into the feasible ball of the perturbations.
Generalized Data-free UAP (GD-UAP): presented a
data-free ‘activation’ loss that is generalizable across
various vision tasks to compute a UAP. They attempt
achieve an objective similar to eqn. (12) without utilizing
any data samples via optimizing the following loss:
Loss =− log(
K∏
i=1
||li(v)||2) (13)
such that ||v||p ≤  (14)
CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG−19 ResNet−152
Figure 2. FR@K computed for various CNN models for multiple adversarial attacks. Note that the attacks are mentioned in the legend and
the model name is provided below the corresponding plot.
where, li(v) is the response of ith layer, and K is the total
number of layers in the model.
We chose the best hyper-parameters for all the attacks
(e.g. number of iterations, etc.) as mentioned in the corre-
sponding works or via conducting ablation. Also, we con-
sider l∞ norm of 10 for restricting the strength of the per-
turbation (). However, note that the CW and DeepFool at-
tacks because of their nature, do not impose the same max-
norm restriction on the perturbations. In case of CW attack,
we use a relatively large value of 15 for binary-search steps,
which helps in determining the trade off-constant c.
In summary, we consider the best operating parame-
ters for all the attacks in order to ensure the comparison
is fair. We present some useful ablations over these hyper-
parameters (e.g. CW) in the supplementary material.
3.1. FR@K
Fooling rate at rank K (FR@K) gives the success rate
of an attack to demote the pre-attack label beyond the first
K ranks after the attack. Figure 2 shows FR@K for var-
ious attacks computed on multiple models. We computed
the results for K = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and, 100. Note that
K can take a maximum value of 999 since the total number
of categories in ILSVRC is 1000. We can notice that, as ex-
pected, the FR@K falls with K, since it gets more difficult
for the attack to demote the pre-attack label further.
However, we make a very important observation about
the DeepFool [13] and CW [3] attacks. They could not de-
mote the pre-attack label further. FR@K becomes zero
for all the higher values of K. Specifically, in all the 10000
correctly classified validation images that we considered for
evaluation, the highest rank DeepFool could successfully
demote to is 3. In almost all the cases, it makes the model
to simply swap the first and second labels. Note that this be-
haviour is consistent across all the models. This behaviour
can be explained from the design of the attack. The Deep-
Fool algorithm searches for the nearest decision boundary
to the input sample and finds a contamination in order to
move the sample across that boundary. Therefore, it ends
up fooling the model to predict the nearest class to the pre-
attack label which is top-2 (or top-3) label before the at-
tack. For the CW attack, we used a variant in which the
adversary is crafted to make the pre-attack label least-likely
CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG-19 ResNet-152
FGSM 0.7 0.4 0.44 0.19
IFGSM-LL 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.43
PGD 0.79 0.83 0.68 0.71
DeepFool 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
CW 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
UAP 0.33 0.28 0.4 0.32
GD-UAP 0.58 0.5 0.42 0.29
Table 1. Area under the FR@K curves for multiple models under
various adversarial attacks.
(i.e. poorly ranked after the attack). We observed that the
resulting attack’s behaviour is similar to the ‘best case’ sce-
nario proposed by the authors in which the post-attack label
is the second most probable label before perturbing. Please
note that the CW attack doesn’t guarantee the lp norm of the
perturbation to be smaller than a predefined value, rather, it
only minimises through the objective (eq. 9). Hence, we
chose a variant whose average perturbation is comparable
to the other attacks in order to provide a fair comparison.
Please refer to the supplemental material for a stronger ver-
sion of the CW attack.
Apart from extracting such hidden details about the at-
tacks, we can also convert these graphs into metrics such
as the area under the curve (AuC), which can be used for
a direct quantitative comparison. For instance, if one looks
for an attack that can demote the pre-attack label strongly, it
should have a high AuC for the FR@K plot. Similarly a ro-
bust model would have a low AuC for multiple attacks. Ta-
ble 1 shows the AuC computed for the curves shown in Fig-
ure 2. In terms of performance with respect to AuC metric,
attacks such as PGD and I-FGSM-LL inflict the maximum
disruption to the visual features discriminative to the pre-
attack label. Notice that the AuC generally decreases as the
models get sophisticated from left to right. This increased
robustness can be attributed to the advanced network ar-
chitectures with efficient regularizers such as dropout and
batchnorm.
3.2. QI-Wup
Figure 3 presents the QI-Wup measure computed for
multiple models over various attacks. For all these exper-
iments we have used a threshold (Ts) of 0.7 on the Wup
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Figure 3. QI-Wup computed for various CNN models for multiple adversarial attacks. Note that the attacks are mentioned in the legend
and the model names are provided below the corresponding plot.
similarity.
It can be observed that image agnostic attacks such as
UAP [12], GD-UAP [14] consistently result in a strong
semantic damage compared to the image specific counter-
parts. This can also be explained from the fooling patterns
of these attacks. In case of image agnostic attacks, the exis-
tence of ‘dominant’ post-attack labels is observed. That is,
after the attack, the pre-attack labels are generally mapped
to a small set of sink classes. For instance, in case of UAP,
post-attack labels computed for all the 50000 validation im-
ages on GoogLeNet comprise only 17% of the total cate-
gories. It is hypothesized [12] that the dominant labels oc-
cupy large space and hence represent good candidates for
these attacks to fool the models. However, this is not the
case with the image specific attacks. It is observed that the
DeepFool and CW attacks generally inflict the smallest se-
mantic damage compared to the others. Note that this is
consistent with the observation in section 3.1 that they re-
sult in least FR@K.
Among the image specific attacks, I-FGSM-LL inflicts
maximum semantic confusion. This is understandable,
since this attempts to make the model predict the least-likely
label which is generally (visually) far away from the pre-
attack label. Hence, in general, the two labels should also
be semantically very far away. However, it is interesting to
note that PGD and FGSM attacks also inflict stronger se-
mantic damage.
We experimented with different threshold values (Ts)
for the Wup measure. Figure 4 shows the QI-Wup val-
ues for different threshold values computed for the VGG-19
model. Note that as threshold value decreases it becomes
difficult for the attacks to cause severe semantic confusion
and the metric becomes close to indiscernible. On the other
hand, higher value of Ts will bring out the subtle differences
among the attacks.
3.3. QI-Vis
Figure 5 shows the QI-V is metric computed for vari-
ous adversarial attacks over multiple CNN models. Note
that we have used visual similarities extracted from the cor-
responding CNN models as detailed in section 2.4 and a
threshold (Tv) value of 0.1. That means, a flipping is con-
sidered ‘visually fooling’ only if the visual similarity be-
Figure 4. Mean semantic confusion (QI-Wup) caused by various
attacks on VGG-19 computed with different threshold values for
Wup similarity.
tween the pre-attack label and post-attack label is less than
0.1. Note that this threshold is very small compared to Ts.
This is because the Wup similarity scores in general are high
even for a trivial case of semantically dissimilar labels. For
e.g. Brain Coral and Jack fruit (Figure 6) have a Wup sim-
ilarity of 0.46. On the other hand, the visual similarities
computed from the network (sec. 2.4) are very low. Supple-
mental document provides the percentile graph computed
for GoogLeNet visual similarities. We observe that 95% of
the similarities are less than 0.1. Thus, we chose Tv = 0.1
for our analysis.
Due to the presence of dominant labels in the post-attack
labels, the image agnostic attacks (UAP, GD-UAP) cause
more visual confusion compared to the image specific at-
tacks. Image specific attacks such I-FGSM-LL also inflict
significant visual confusion to the models. Also, note that
the visual confusion caused by FGSM and PGD is signifi-
cantly higher than that by CW and DeepFool.
In summary, iterative attacks remove most evidence for
the pre-attack label and cause severe demotion. Image ag-
nostic, and targeted attacks can do severe damage with re-
spect to all the three metrics on most of the CNN models.
Interestingly, simple FGSM based attacks also cause signif-
icant damage (which is non-trivial given only their fooling
rate performance) with respect to proposed metrics.
Among the models, ResNet-152 has the least AuC fol-
lowed by VGG-19. Further, ResNet-152 has smallest
CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG−19 ResNet−152
Figure 5. QI-Vis computed for various CNN models for multiple adversarial attacks. Note that the model is mentioned below the corre-
sponding plot.
Tennis ball Granny Smith
Brain Coral Jackfruit
Figure 6. Similar ‘object’ patterns can cause severe semantic con-
fusion. First column shows input samples and their pre-attack la-
bels and the second column shows the representative images from
the predicted post-attack labels.
QI-Wup followed by GoogLeNet. In terms of QI-vis,
GoogLeNet incurs least damage followed by VGG-19. In-
terestingly, ResNet-152 demonstrates the highest QI-V is.
4. Discussion
In this section, we present some interesting observations
that we have come across while analysing the attacks.
4.1. Visual vs Semantic similarity
It is as challenging as it is interesting to discuss ‘if the vi-
sual similarity correlates to the semantic similarity’ or vice
versa. In computer vision, it is often taken for granted that
they both are correlated [4]. While analysing the confusion
of the CNN models to adversarial attacks, we have come
across interesting examples about the visual and semantic
similarity. Figure 6 shows a pair of example images pre-
sented to a trained GoogLeNet under the DeepFool adver-
sarial attack. The first column shows the original images
with the ground truth label mentioned in green below them.
In the second column we show the representative samples
Alp
Mixing-bowl Eggnog
Yurt
Figure 7. Similar context can also cause models to easily confuse
across classes. First column shows input samples and the corre-
sponding pre-attack labels and the second column shows the rep-
resentative images from the predicted post-attack labels.
for the post-attack labels predicted by the model. Note that
the post-attack labels are mentioned below them in red.
We intentionally chose the DeepFool attack for it causes
the least semantic confusion. However, in this case it is very
clear that the post-attack labels are semantically far away
(Wup similarities are 0.35 and 0.46) from the pre-attack la-
bels. However, upon investigating, we found that the vi-
sual patterns of the post-attack labels are similar to those
of the pre-attack labels. Their visual similarities given by
the model (refer to sec. 2.4) are 0.17 and 0.23 respectively.
Please note that they are large compared to the 95% per-
centile similarity of 0.1. In both the cases, the post-attack
labels are ranked 2 before the attack. It can be explained
with the learning procedure. The only input that the CNN
model has received about the object categories is the images
belonging to those categories. Therefore, the model tries
to learn the discriminative visual patterns for each category
from the corresponding samples. Visually similar patterns
thus can cause the model to confuse across categories that
are semantically far apart, though such cases are not very
common. In case of the examples presented in Figure 6, due
Figure 8. Confusion among fine-grained categories. Figure shows
the % of dog samples that are misclassified as another dog cate-
gory. Note that the analysis is performed on GoogLeNet for 800
validation images from 117 dog categories of ILSVRC dataset.
to the similar visual patterns DeepFool attack could suc-
cessfully inflict a severe semantic confusion. However, in
general we observe the top ranked labels to be both visually
and semantically similar.
4.2. Influence of context
As an extension to the previous subsection, we present
the confusion caused by visual patterns from the context.
Figure 7 shows the images and corresponding ground truth
labels on the left. On the right, the representative image for
the predicted post-attack labels corresponding to them are
shown. In the first case, presence of sky region, landscapes
makes the model to consider the two classes to be visually
closer. In case of other samples of Yurt category, we ob-
serve that the shape of the Yurt being very similar to that of
the Alp. The visual similarity given by the model for the two
classes (sec. 2.4) is 0.137. Similarly, in the second exam-
ple, presence of the bowl(s) in the eggnog sample makes the
model to confuse between the two classes. Almost all the
samples from eggnog class have a very close context as that
of mixing-bowl. In this case, the visual similarity is 0.25.
4.3. Confusion among the fine-grained categories
In this subsection, we analyse the confusion of a CNN
model among the fine-grained visual categories under vari-
ous adversarial attacks. In particular, we chose the 117 dog
breed categories and GoogLeNet for this analysis. We con-
sider 800 validation samples belonging to these categories
and compute the percentage of intra-dog category confu-
sions. Figure 8 shows the % of samples that are confused
among these fine-grained categories, i.e., foolings in which
a dog sample is misclassified as another dog category. Note
that the confusion caused within the fine-grained categories
by the image specific attacks is significantly high. Also, in
spite of the existence of ‘dominant labels’, image agnos-
tic attacks also fool the CNN among the fine-grained cate-
gories.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we challenge the current consensus in the
field of using fooling rate alone as a metric for evaluating
the quality of an adversarial attack. We introduce three ad-
ditional metrics FR@K, QI-Wup, and QI-V is that cap-
ture three different aspects of the fooling. They helped in
bringing out previously unknown strengths and weaknesses
of these attacks which would be helpful while deploying the
CNN models in real-world environments. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing works evaluates with met-
rics other than ‘fooling rate’. We list some of the important
inferences drawn from our work:
• Our experimental results bring out the usefulness of
the new metrics by clearly differentiating attack be-
haviours. For instance, AuC computed from the
FR@K graphs (Tab. 1) reveal that the attacks vary
in their ability to reduce the confidence assigned to
the pre-attack label. PGD demonstrates significantly
higher AuC values suggesting its superiority over the
others. This is interesting and in line with the observa-
tion that PGD attack is the most robust against current
adversarial defenses [10], which might be attributed to
its ability to reduce the confidence to the pre-attack
label. Similarly, the observation that Deep Fool (and
CW) attack generally swaps the top 2 labels is non-
trivial with only ‘fooling rate’.
• QI-Wup metric (Fig. 3) reveals that some of the attacks
(e.g. FGSM based) that are less effective with respect
to ‘fooling rate’, are comparatively more severe on a
semantic scale than their counter parts. On the other
hand, attacks such as Deep Fool while achieving a high
‘fooling rate’ inflict least amount of semantic damage.
Clearly, when analysing the semantic damage inflicted
by the attacks (or incurred by models), fooling rate can
not serve the need.
• Our experiments reveal (Sec. 4.3, Fig. 3) that some of
the strongest adversarial attacks such as PGD achieve
significant fooling (> 85%) via confusing the models
among visually similar, fine-grained categories which
are only ∼ 12% of the total categories. Without this
information, higher fooling rates achieved by these
attacks may project the classifiers as unsophisticated
to the community and more importantly to the policy
makers. Similarly, attacks such as CW and DeepFool,
in spite of resulting a very high (top-1) fooling rate,
cause significantly lesser visual and semantic confu-
sion. On the other hand, relatively simple attacks such
as FGSM and FGSM-LL cause higher visual and se-
mantic damage. These aspects throw new light on the
attacks and the way they achieve the fooling.
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6. Supplementary
6.1. Extension To Targeted Attacks
We believe that the proposed metrics can easily be ex-
tended to targeted attacks. A targeted attack is considered
to be successful when it fools a model into falsely predicting
a specific target label for the adversarial image and is con-
sidered to be a failure otherwise. However the attack can
be considered a success even if it fools a model into falsely
predicting a label that is semantically/visually similar to the
target class. Hence, the proposed metrics in eq.3, and 5 can
be modified for targeted attacks as follows:
QI-Wup-Targeted =
{
1, ifWup(target label, post-attack label) < Ts.
0, otherwise.
QI-V is-Targeted =
{
1, if V is(target label, post-attack label) < Tv.
0, otherwise.
6.2. Visual similarities learned by the CNNs
In this section we present more information about the
visual similarities introduced in sec 2 of the main draft. We
consider GoogLeNet for the analysis presented here. Note
that the visual similarities are model specific and might vary
across different models. Figure 9 shows the pairwise visual
similarities learned by the GoogLeNet. Figure 10 shows the
percentile graph for the visual similarities computed among
the 1000 object classes of the ILSVRC dataset. The graph
shows percentage of the pairwise visual similarities (on x-
axis) that have a value less than a given similarity on y-
axis. The minimum visual similarity is around -0.25 and
the maximum is 1.0. Note that for better visualization, we
present a zoomed-in plot. The threshold (Tv) for computing
the mean visual confusion (sec. 3 of the main draft) was
chosen to be 0.1 since 95% of the categories have visual
similarities less than 0.1 as per the percentile graph. We
can observe a “knee point” at the the 95% percentile on the
x axis.
Figure 9. Pairwise visual similarities learned by by GoogLeNet for
the 1000 categories of ILSVRC dataset.
6.3. Semantic similarities across the ILSVRC cate-
gories
In this section we present the semantic similarities
among the 1000 object categories present in the ILSVRC
dataset. We have used Wu-Palmer (Wup) similarity mea-
sure for computing the semantic similarity. Note that these
similarities are independent of the CNN model. Figure 11
shows the pairwise Wup similarity computed for all the
1000 object categories in ILSVRC dataset. We can observe
high similarity values among the dog breed categories rang-
ing between the class indices 150 and 270 (the red square
block). Note that the CNN models also learn high visual
similarities among these fine-grained categories. We can
observe similar block in Figure 9. Figure 12 shows the per-
centile graph for the computed semantic similarities. It is
observed that the Wup similarities are in general high. For
instance, 50% of the similarities are higher than 0.4. There-
fore, the semantic similarities are in general large compared
Figure 10. Percentile graph for the visual similarities computed for
GoogLeNet trained. X-axis shows the % of visual similarities that
are less than a chosen value on Y-axis.
Figure 11. Pairwise Wup (Wu-Palmer) similarities computed for
the 1000 object categories present in ILSVRC dataset.
to their visual counter parts. Hence, the threshold (Ts) cho-
sen to compute the mean semantic confusion (sec. 3 of the
main draft) is 0.7. Note that this is the knee point equiva-
lent the one chosen for visual similarities, i.e., 95% of the
categories have semantic similarities less than 0.7.
6.4. Ablations for CW attack
The choice of learning rate (for optimizing the objective
function) has not been discussed in case of Carlini-Wagner
attack in its original paper [3]. We noticed significant vari-
ance in the quality of the attack at different learning rates.
Although there was an increase in the performance in terms
of all three metrics as we increased the learning rate, we no-
ticed large distortion in the image quality beyond learning
rate of 0.1 and hence a learning rate of 0.1 was chosen. The
performance metrics for GoogLeNet architecture for all the
3 proposed metrics are shown in Figures 13, 14 and 15. To
Figure 12. Percentile graph for the semantic (Wu-Palmer) similari-
ties computed for the object categories present in ILSVRC dataset.
X-axis shows the % of semantic similarities that are smaller than
a chosen value on Y-axis.
Figure 13. Effect of learning rate in CW on our FR@K metric.
summarise, we observed large visual contamination (and lp
norm of the contamination of the crafted perturbation) for
learning rates higher than 0.1. Therefore, in order to pro-
vide a reasonable comparison with other attacks, we report
(in the main draft) the metrics with the default values of the
hyper-parameters. However, please note that the attack’s
performance can strongly vary against the strength of the
perturbation which is not directly limited by their objective.
Figure 14. Effect of learning rate in CW on our QI-Vis metric.
Figure 15. Effect of learning rate in CW on our QI-Wup metric.
